The Civil War in Prince William County

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Prince William County Historical Commission

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle of First Manassas</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayfield Fort</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire (Wilmer McLean Home)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn’s Ford</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Hill</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Lomond Manor House</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hill</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudley Methodist Church</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potomac River Blockade</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freestone Point (Leesylvania State Park)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cockpit Point (Possum Nose) Battery</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William’s Ordinary (Love’s Tavern), Dumfries</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evansport - Shipping Point Batteries</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occoquan</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon Race Church Site</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf Run Shoals and Sally-Davis Ford Defenses</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle of Second Manassas</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone House</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucinda Dogan House</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloom (Conner) House</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoroughfare Gap – Chapman’s (Beverley) Mill</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groveton Confederate Cemetery</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfinished Railroad</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone Bridge</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cavalry Operations and Mosby’s Confederacy</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul’s Church, Haymarket</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selecman’s (Snyder’s) Ford</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopewell Gap – Antioch Church</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewell’s Chapel</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon Branch Fort</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Singleton Mosby</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle of Bristoe Station</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristoe Station</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brentsville</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle of Buckland and the Buckland Races</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckland</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manassas Town Cemetery (Confederate Monument)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix A: Chronology of the Civil War in Prince William County</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix B: Map of Civil War Sites in Prince William County</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

On April 17, 1861, five days after the first shots were fired at Fort Sumter and two days after President Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion, the Virginia Convention passed an ordinance of secession. The citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia voted overwhelmingly to ratify succession from the Union on May 23, 1861, officially making the commonwealth and Prince William County a part of the Confederacy. With that act, the war in Virginia began.

The Civil War would have a significant impact on Prince William County. At the start few had any notion of the devastation and suffering that the war would bring. With strong patriotic convictions local men eagerly volunteered for military service and eventually formed all or part of the following Confederate units: Prince William Cavalry (Company A, 4th Virginia Cavalry), Bull Run Rangers/Evergreen Guards (Company C, 8th Virginia Infantry), Champe Rifles (Company D, 8th Virginia Infantry), Prince William Rifles (Company F, 17th Virginia Infantry), Ewell Guards (Company A, 49th Virginia Infantry), Quantico Guards (Company B, 49th Virginia Infantry), Centreville Rifles (Lowry's Company, Virginia Light Artillery), Mosby's Rangers (43d Battalion, Virginia Cavalry), and the Chincapin Rangers (Brawner's/Kincheloe's Company, Partisan Rangers).

Three decisive Civil War battles and numerous smaller actions took place within the county. The First Battle of Manassas (Bull Run), on July 21, 1861, preceded by a smaller affair at Blackburn's Ford on July 18, was the first major confrontation of the war resulting in a stunning defeat for the North. Confederate batteries along Prince William's shoreline subsequently blockaded the Potomac River from mid October 1861 to early March of 1862. The Confederate guns were a serious annoyance to northern shipping and the Union Navy. Union occupation followed the withdrawal of the Confederate army from the area on March 9, 1862, but the war was far from over in Prince William County.

In late August 1862, General Robert E. Lee boldly divided his forces and sent Stonewall Jackson on a circuitous march into Prince William County in an effort to draw the Union army under General John Pope to battle on ground more favorable to the Confederates. After capturing Pope's supply depot at Manassas Junction early on August 27, Jackson’s forces repulsed a New Jersey brigade at Bull Run Bridge near Union Mills and fought a rear guard action at Bristoe Station (Battle of Kettle Run) on the same day. Another small engagement at Thoroughfare Gap on August 28 enabled Lee to reunite his forces and ultimately led to a decisive victory over Pope’s army in the Second Battle of Manassas, August 29-30.

Wade Hampton and J.E.B. Stuart led major cavalry incursions behind Union lines and into Prince William County in December of 1862 as Lee confronted General Ambrose Burnside at Fredericksburg. Partisan leader John Singleton Mosby, the famed "Gray Ghost of the Confederacy," also frequented Prince William County on various raids from early 1863 to the war's end.
On October 14, 1863, a portion of Lee's army under General A.P. Hill suffered a bloody repulse at Bristoe Station. This engagement and the associated "Buckland Races" on October 19, 1863, effectively ended Lee's last major offensive campaign of the war.

The following history of the Civil War in Prince William County was originally drafted as a multiple properties nomination form for the National Register of Historic Places by Prince William County Archeologist Jan Townsend based on historical narratives prepared by historical consultant J. Michael Miller. The text has been edited and expanded to include information about Prince William County’s numerous Civil War sites by Prince William County Historical Commissioner James Burgess with contributions from Commissioner Ron Smith. Period photographs are from the Library of Congress and National Archives collections while most of the modern day color photographs were taken by Commissioner Tom Knock. Dolores Elder of the Occoquan Historical Society also deserves credit for her photography at the site of Selecman’s Ford.

Manassas Junction was left in ruins after the withdrawal of Confederate forces in March 1862.
Battle of First Manassas

At 2 A.M. on May 24, 1861, Union troops in Washington, D.C. crossed the Potomac River and occupied the City of Alexandria and surrounding countryside. Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, commanding the 35,000 Union troops of the Army of Northeastern Virginia stationed around Washington, now had a foothold for further operations in Virginia. McDowell established his headquarters at Arlington, the recently vacated home of Robert E. Lee.

In late May 1861, General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was assigned to command the Confederate Army of the Potomac, then forming at Manassas Junction in Prince William County. Arriving at Manassas Junction on June 1, Beauregard had direct orders to protect Northern Virginia from any Union attack. The Confederate strategy was essentially defensive. It was believed that if the Confederacy could maintain its territorial integrity and inflict heavy losses on any invaders, the North would lose patience with the war and arrange a peace.

McDowell was in no hurry to engage the Confederate army, at least until he had trained and organized his own troops. At the very beginning of the war, northern military strategy, as proposed by General Winfield Scott, was first to encircle the entire Confederacy with a naval blockade and then send an expedition down the Mississippi River to close this major artery of Southern supply. In Scott’s “Anaconda Plan” the South, with all its means of support closed, would eventually sue for peace.

The northern public would not wait for such a protracted plan to work. They clamored for a confrontation with the main Confederate army in Northern Virginia, believing this would quickly end the war. President Abraham Lincoln yielded to political pressure and despite the advice of his generals, ordered an advance on Manassas Junction in June. McDowell protested but to no avail. McDowell then began developing a plan that he hoped would allow him to capture Manassas Junction without a major struggle.
According to McDowell's plan, Union forces would move to Fairfax Court House and then to Centreville, directly opposing Beauregard's Confederate army on the other side of Bull Run. McDowell would then send a flanking column south around the Confederate right, forcing the enemy into a retreat to prevent a rapid Union advance on Richmond. The plan depended on Beauregard being intimidated by the superior number of Union troops and retreating without a major battle, for which neither side was prepared. To prevent Confederate reinforcements from strengthening Manassas Junction, the Union army in the Shenandoah Valley, under Major General Robert Patterson's command, was instructed to keep the Confederates in his front, General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of the Shenandoah, occupied with a simultaneous advance.

McDowell's campaign was scheduled to begin on July 8, 1861. The new army, however, had organizational, logistical and supply problems. At 2 P.M. on July 16, McDowell finally moved forward with 35,000 men, the largest military force ever assembled in North America.

Through a spy network in Washington, Beauregard was aware of the Union preparations and used June and early July to build up his own army for the coming battle. Almost daily, new regiments from all over the South joined his command; but, as McDowell’s army advanced towards Prince William County, he still only had 22,000 troops to hold Manassas Junction. Bull Run offered a natural line of defense. Beauregard knew that any Union attack would have to cross this stream at one of the numerous fords or the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike, and so his troops were concentrated at these points to await the Union advance.

McDowell’s troops swept aside the forward Confederate outposts at Fairfax Court House without a struggle on July 17, 1861 and took possession of Centreville on the morning of July 18, again without a fight. The Confederate pickets fell back to their defensive line along Bull Run where they were determined to hold their ground against the advancing Union army directly in their front. Beauregard telegraphed Richmond for reinforcements. President Jefferson Davis ordered all the men he had at Richmond and Fredericksburg to Manassas Junction. He also sent word to General Joseph E. Johnston at Winchester to reinforce Beauregard with his 12,000 men from the Army of the Shenandoah. On July 18
Yorkshire

Wilmer McLean married well. His wife’s 1200-acre Yorkshire Plantation became their home following their marriage in 1853. As Union forces approached on July 17, 1861, Gen. Beauregard shifted his headquarters temporarily to the McLean home. The following afternoon Yorkshire came under Union artillery fire as fighting raged at nearby Blackburn’s Ford. A Union 20-pounder Parrott shell struck McLean’s detached kitchen, destroying a meal being prepared for the general. McLean’s new barn, built in 1856, served as a field hospital, sheltering Confederate troops wounded during the skirmish. When the Confederate army evacuated Manassas in March 1862, McLean moved his family south for their safety and to maintain his business contracts with the Confederate government. Eventually they settled at what was thought to be an isolated and safe location, Appomattox Court House. Ironically, the war caught up to McLean. On April 9, 1865, General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to General Grant in McLean's parlor at Appomattox.
move forward on the left and the 1st Massachusetts on the right of the guns. As the two howitzers opened fire the entire stream bottom erupted with heavy volleys of musketry. The New Yorkers became heavily engaged and within a half hour much of the regiment fell back in disorder, dangerously exposing the left flank of the 1st Massachusetts. Captain Ayres withdrew his howitzers after firing away all of his canister rounds and some spherical case shot.

Having become satisfied that the enemy was present in strong force, Tyler ordered Richardson’s battered infantry to disengage. Ayres’ Battery along with the two 20-pounder Parrott rifles under Lt. Benjamin were then directed to fire on the opposing Confederate battery positions and a lively albeit ineffective artillery exchange continued until about 4 p.m. The eight Union guns fired a total of 415 shots while seven Confederate guns returned 310 rounds in the course of about an hour.

Forcibly made aware of the strength of the Confederate positions along Bull Run after the engagement at Blackburn's Ford, McDowell abandoned his plan to flank the Confederate right. He spent the next two days scouting Beauregard's position and bringing up supplies. Unknowingly, he allowed Confederate reinforcements time to reach Manassas Junction. Johnston’s reinforcements brought Confederate strength at Manassas to 34,000 men, which was roughly equal to that of McDowell. The Union numerical advantage had disappeared almost overnight. Johnston himself arrived at Manassas Junction on July 20, 1861. Although he was the senior officer, Johnston allowed Beauregard to remain in immediate command of the deployed Southern forces.

McDowell’s new plan was to turn Beauregard’s left flank, situated at Stone Bridge, by crossing at an unguarded upper ford discovered in the vicinity of Sudley Springs. Once the Confederate left had been turned, the rest of McDowell’s army could then cross the fords and join in the battle. Beauregard, however, was not waiting to be attacked. He planned his own offensive movement against the Union left flank at Centreville, intending to cross over the lower fords of Bull Run. Both these movements were scheduled to take place early on July 21. If they had occurred simultaneously, the two armies would have moved around each other in a circle.
At 2:30 A.M., McDowell’s army broke camp and marched in three columns towards Bull Run. After disorganized maneuvering in the early morning darkness, the battle opened at 6:00 A.M. with the discharge of a 30-pounder Parrott rifle attached to General Daniel Tyler’s division positioned in front of the Stone Bridge, over which the Warrenton Turnpike crossed Bull Run. However, this fire was only a demonstration to divert Confederate attention away from the main Union column crossing Bull Run two miles upstream at Sudley Ford. Due to delays in getting across the Cub Run Bridge outside of Centreville, the extra distance to march, inexperienced, undisciplined soldiers unaccustomed to complicated military maneuvers, among other reasons, the Union flanking column did not reach Sudley Ford until 9:30 A.M.

This delay dearly cost the Union army. Without the cover of darkness, the Union column was observed by General Beauregard’s signal officer, Captain E. Porter Alexander, from his signal station on Wilcoxen Hill (Signal Hill today) behind the Confederate right flank. Using semaphore to alert the Southern commanders of the flanking movement, Alexander sent a signaled message, "Look out on your left, you are turned." Colonel Nathan G. Evans, commanding the small brigade assigned to guard the Stone Bridge and hold the extreme Confederate left, received the message about 9 A.M. and reacted swiftly. He ordered four companies of the 4th South Carolina to remain at the Stone Bridge and took the balance of his brigade, about 900 men, to intercept the advancing Union column.

At about 10:15 A.M. the Union column, led by the 2nd Rhode Island regiment, collided with Evans' battle line on Matthews Hill. Initially the two sides were evenly matched. Evans’ thin line managed to halt the Union advance, wounding division commander, General David Hunter, and mortally wounding Colonel John Slocum and Major Sullivan Ballou of the 2nd Rhode Island. One of Evans’ units, Major Wheat’s Louisiana battalion, then charged causing confusion in the Union ranks until the balance of Colonel Ambrose Burnside’s brigade arrived on the field. This fighting, however, bought sufficient time for two Southern brigades from General Johnston’s army to arrive on the field and strengthen the Confederate line.

Part of the Wilcoxen farm in 1861, this elevation was in rear of General Beauregard's right flank at Union Mills. From his hilltop signal station, signal officer Captain E.P. Alexander spotted the Union flanking column beyond the Confederate left flank on the morning of July 21, 1861. Alexander’s timely signal flag warning to Colonel Nathan Evans at the Stone Bridge, nearly eight miles to the northwest, enabled Evans to intercept the Union column and buy time for reinforcements to arrive. This greatly contributed to the Confederate victory at First Manassas. The monument was erected in 1998.
With these reinforcements the Confederates were able to hold back the Union army for another hour but the Union line was also growing in size as Colonel Andrew Porter’s brigade arrived followed by the regiments under Colonel William Franklin. Now outnumbered three to one and taking heavy casualties, the Confederate line began to waver. Around noon the rapid approach of Colonel William T. Sherman's brigade, which had crossed Bull Run at a farm ford above the Stone Bridge, made the Confederate position untenable. Faced with envelopment by Union forces, the Confederates retreated in disorder. A Union victory seemed eminent but the primary objective, the strategically important Manassas Junction, was still five miles away to the south.

After reaching the Warrenton Turnpike, McDowell was forced to halt and reform his regiments before continuing the pursuit of the retreating Confederates in the direction of Manassas Junction. This delay, however, allowed sufficient time for the Confederates to stabilize their lines on Henry Hill. More Confederate reinforcements from General Johnston’s army arrived to bolster those units that had been fighting all morning. While rallying the men of the 4th Alabama, Brigadier General Barnard Bee of South Carolina pointed his sword toward the newly arrived and steady brigade of Brigadier General Thomas J. Jackson and reportedly shouted, "Look! There is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" The legend of Stonewall Jackson was thus born. Jackson's brigade made up the nucleus of the new Confederate defensive line which had formed on Henry Hill. Although 6,500 men with 13 cannon held the hill, they were still outnumbered by McDowell's seemingly victorious Union army.

About 1:30 P.M. McDowell issued what was intended to be the order to destroy the Confederate army and end the battle. To press what was thought to be a retreating enemy, two Union batteries under Captains James B. Ricketts and Charles Griffin were ordered forward to Henry Hill. Upon reaching the top of the hill the Union batteries were confronted by a line of Confederate artillery at close range.

The battle soon centered around the Union batteries, whose guns became immobile as the battery horses were simultaneously hit by Jackson's artillery and short-range musket fire. Supporting Union infantry fell back to the Sudley Road and was struck in flank by a surprise cavalry charge led by Colonel J.E.B. Stuart. This left the disabled Union guns vulnerable to

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**BEN LOMOND MANOR HOUSE**

*(10321 Sudley Manor Drive, Manassas. For information, visit www.pwcgov.org/historicsites)*

In 1832, Benjamin Tasker Chinn built this two story house of locally quarried sandstone on 1,179 acres that originally was part of Robert "King" Carter's Lower Bull Run Tract. At the time of the Civil War the house was the residence of Thomas and Andrew Pringle. Like many other structures in the vicinity of Manassas Battlefield, the Pringle house was used as a temporary field hospital in July 1861. Edward D. Craighill, a young hospital steward with the 2nd Virginia Infantry, helped treat Confederate wounded here until they could be evacuated to general hospitals. After the Confederate army’s evacuation of the area in March 1862, passing Union troops left graffiti on many interior walls of the house.
HENRY HILL

On July 21, 1861, Confederate General Thomas J. Jackson stood on the eastern side of this plateau (above left), owned by the Henry family, and won the name "Stonewall." This is also where the "Rebel Yell" was first heard as the men of Jackson's brigade overran and captured the Union batteries of Captains James B. Ricketts and Charles Griffin.

The original Henry House was completely destroyed during the war but the Henry family built a new home on the site in the 1870s. Nearby is the grave of 85-year-old widow Judith Carter Henry, the only civilian fatality at First Manassas. A stone obelisk on the east side of the house honors the fallen "Patriots" of First Bull Run. Erected in June 1865, it is one of the earliest Civil War battlefield monuments.

attack by Jackson’s infantry. Charge and countercharge under a boiling July sun swept over the guns. The Union troops struggled to recover the guns but neither side was able to control them. McDowell still held a strong position on the rest of the battlefield, but his men were becoming exhausted from the long day of combat. To make matters worse, about 4 P.M. new Confederate brigades were just reaching the battlefield. These fresh troops swung the balance of the battle west of the Sudley Road.

The brigades of Brigadier General E. Kirby Smith and Colonel Jubal A. Early, plus two South Carolina regiments from General Miledge Bonham’s brigade and Lieutenant R.F. Beckham’s battery of four guns gained positions on the Chinn Farm to deliver a devastating fire into the front and right flank of the last Union brigade to reach the battlefield. This brigade, under Colonel Oliver O. Howard, had been directed to turn the Confederate left on Henry Hill but was soon overwhelmed and thrown into disorder instead. By 5 P.M., Beauregard ordered an attack all along the battle line, which drove the Union troops in confusion from the field.

Panic spread and order left the army despite the efforts of Union officers. The day's combat was too much for the inexperienced troops. McDowell did his best to rally his army, but in vain. A fleeing mob clogged the roads to Centreville. Beauregard, seeing an opportunity to deal the North a crushing blow, sent his fresh infantry, cavalry and a battery after McDowell’s army. J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalary pursuit ended prematurely at Sudley Church after his troopers had captured more Yankees than they could safely guard. The Alexandria Light Artillery under Captain Delaware Kemper crossed Bull Run at the Stone Bridge and was successful in shelling the retreating Union column near the Cub Run Bridge. One Confederate shell caused a wagon to overturn on the narrow bridge, blocking the escape route and causing greater panic among the Unions. Many Union guns, to include the huge 30-pounder Parrott rifle, were abandoned and captured at Cub Run.
Upon receiving a report that other Union units were advancing to attack his right at Union Mills, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crossed Bull Run, Beauregard recalled the infantry in pursuit of the retreating Union army. By the time it was learned the rumor was groundless, darkness was near and the Union army was well on its way to safety.

The victory at First Manassas cost the Confederacy 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing. In contrast, the Union army lost 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, and 1,312 missing, most of whom were captured. The Confederate army never followed up its victory with an assault on Washington, preferring to resume a defensive posture. The Northern population became even more determined to fight the war to victory. The Battle of First Manassas had taught the military leaders of both armies that they had a long way to go before the units of citizen soldiers could be developed into powerful armies.

Minor skirmishes occurred between the opposing armies in the months afterward, but the bigger danger to the troops on both sides was disease. Because so many men were living in close contact in less than sanitary conditions often with contaminated water sources, health problems were tremendous. Measles, mumps, typhoid, debilitating dysentery, diarrhea, pneumonia, and a host of other diseases caused many deaths of soldiers who had never seen combat.

At Camp Jones in the vicinity of Bristoe Station south of Manassas Junction the Confederate brigades of Brigadier General William Whiting and Colonel Cadmus Wilcox suffered significant losses from disease between August and September of 1861. Those who perished were buried with military honors in cemeteries established

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Landon Carter of "Woodland" Plantation donated the land for Sudley Church in 1822. Church services were cancelled when 15,000 Union troops began crossing nearby Sudley Springs Ford on the morning of Sunday, July 21, 1861. The building became a Union army field hospital and quickly filled with the wounded and dying. Nearly 300 men were abandoned here during the Union retreat for lack of ambulances and were captured by the 1st Virginia Cavalry. Colonel John Slocum and Major Sullivan Ballou of the 2d Rhode Island Regiment were among those who died at Sudley. Also left for dead here was a New Hampshire private, John L. Rice, who survived with the aid of church neighbors Amos and Margaret Benson.

The church suffered extensive damage during Second Manassas and was completely rebuilt after the war putting the congregation in debt for $200. In 1886, John Rice returned to visit the Bensons and, to show his gratitude for their kindness, he subsequently raised $235 to pay off the church debt.

Lightning caused a fire that destroyed the second church in August 1918. The present structure, the third to occupy the site, dates to 1922 and has since been enlarged. Although many soldiers died and were buried in the vicinity, there was no church cemetery at the time of the Civil War. The existing cemetery was created in 1896 and a number of Civil War veterans to include Amos Benson now rest there.
outside the camps. Although the graves were initially marked by comrades, few of the grave markers, often crudely carved boards, survived the war. Today many unmarked Confederate graves are believed to remain in the vicinity of Bristoe. Only the location of the 10th Alabama Cemetery is known by virtue of the more permanent stone markers placed at the site by the veterans of the regiment after the war.

Confederate graves from First Manassas on Henry Hill, March 1862.
Potomac River Blockade

After its victory at the Battle of First Manassas the Confederate army, now under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, took up defensive positions along the Occoquan River, with forward positions in Fairfax County. The Union army now under General George B. McClellan was content to build up its strength and prepare for a decisive battle in the spring of 1862. Both armies built large winter camps to shelter their men and long lines of fortifications to protect important positions. The long months of waiting were expected to take their toll, especially on the Confederate army, because the local food supply was inadequate to feed the entire army.

Some historians have described this period as one of inactivity and training for the upcoming 1862 campaigns. During the fall and winter months, however, the Confederacy blockaded the Potomac River, the Northern capital's primary supply route for both military and civilian goods.

The first impetus for a blockade of Washington came when a battery was built at Aquia Creek (Stafford County) to protect the northern terminus of the railroad from Richmond. Aquia's guns, however, were unable to command the main channel of the Potomac River. After studying the Potomac River and its Virginia and Maryland shores, on August 22, 1861, General Samuel Cooper in Richmond ordered the construction of heavy artillery batteries at Evansport, now part of Quantico Marine Corps Base. The Evansport batteries would be the most southerly of four major batteries, all of which would be located in Prince William County.

Union leaders anticipated a Southern blockade and, in response, the U.S. Navy formed a Potomac Flotilla. Its purpose was to control and keep the river open to shipping. The Flotilla, however, had a difficult mission. The Navy tried to gain assistance in the destruction of the batteries as they were being built. In spite of President Lincoln’s and the Secretary of the Navy’s urging, General McClellan refused to cooperate, fearing a major land battle. McClellan wanted to wait until his own army was prepared to move and after other Union offensives had interrupted the railroad communication and supply network of the Confederacy.
On September 3, 1861, General Isaac R. Trimble was selected to command the batteries at Evansport. The command was actually a joint one between the army and navy, with Naval Commander Frederick Chatard actually responsible for the artillery. Construction of the batteries began in earnest, with the Confederates working at night and behind a screen of trees so as not to reveal the batteries' exact locations.

Learning of the northernmost battery at Freestone Point from escaped slaves, the Flotilla, on September 25, 1861, fired on the suspected position. The Freestone Point battery returned fire, confirming the presence of four guns. This was a deliberate effort to divert attention from the batteries still under construction at Cockpit Point (Possum Nose) and Evansport (Shipping Point) further downstream. In the following weeks, however, Union ship captains discovered that the four guns could not command the entire main channel of the Potomac River and that Freestone Point's firepower could be avoided.

On October 12 a large portion of the Potomac Flotilla was ordered to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. The designated ships started down the Potomac on October 15. Commander Craven gave permission for the ships to fire on the suspected batteries as they passed down the river. At 10:30 A.M., the Pocahontas blindly opened fire below Freestone Point. The Confederates at Evansport returned fire as the Seminole, which was following, came into range. For forty minutes a general engagement ensued as the Pocahontas and Seminole passed the batteries at Evansport. No one was injured, but several shells took off the mizzenmast of the Seminole and the ships were sprayed with shell fragments.

The following day, the Pawnee passed the gun emplacements and was struck six times but no serious damage was done. She refused to return the fire. On October 17, three river tug boats with a steamer were dispatched to again test the batteries. Two of the tugs were able to pass undetected, but the third was hit and disabled. The steamer crew did not attempt to make the passage. The batteries were becoming an effective deterrent to shipping.

Cockpit Point (Possum Nose) Battery

The Possum Nose battery, located just south of Cockpit Point (today’s Cherry Hill area), was one of several major batteries secretly built to blockade the Potomac River in October 1861. The high 75-foot bluff projected farther out into the Potomac than the other locations chosen for batteries and it was considered a remarkable military position, commanding the river channel from Freestone Point on the north to Shipping Point on the south. This and the other Confederate batteries, under the command of General G. W. Smith, CSA, severely restricted supplies arriving by water and deprived Washington residents of many essential commodities. The Possum Nose battery earthworks are well preserved today but are not accessible to the public at this time.
On October 17, 1861, Commander Craven advised that no supplies be sent to the capital via the Potomac River. On that day forty ships were waiting to come up the river; they were rerouted to Baltimore. Ships drawing less than eight feet of water were allowed to run the batteries, but only after a warning had been issued by a Union warship.

This was a very serious situation for the Union. Only a single, one-track railroad line connected Washington to Baltimore and the rest of the country. Not only were the city's residents dependent on river trade for food and supplies, but now the main Union army was based in Washington and had to be provided for as well. More importantly, however, was the political embarrassment. The upstart Confederacy was able to blockade the Northern capital with impunity. This opened up the real possibility of recognition and support of the Confederacy by England and France, which was one of the South's major goals.

Major General Joseph Hooker's 8,000-man division was dispatched to the Maryland side of the Potomac opposite the batteries. Confederate commanders were well aware of the importance of the batteries and deployed 12,000 men to protect them. Colonel Wade Hampton's brigade held the Occoquan River line to prevent an overland Union attack. The 4th and 5th Texas Regiments of General Wigfall's brigade were camped on the Telegraph Road between Neabsco and Powells creeks within supporting range of the Potomac River batteries and Wade Hampton's Occoquan line. The 1st Texas Regiment, distributed among the batteries at Evansport below Powells Creek, was ready to repulse an amphibious landing. Cavalry units provided a screen for the entire position, from Evansport on the south to Wolf Run Shoals on the north. Confederate infantry and artillery units stationed at Manassas Junction were prepared to move quickly to eastern Prince William County if an attack should occur.

Washington felt the effects of the blockade almost immediately. Coal and wood were essential during the winter and were in short supply. Food and forage for the animals was more difficult to buy. Prices of most items increased. The surrounding counties in Maryland and Virginia were stripped of their coal, wood, and agricultural resources.
Confederate forces continued to improve their hold on the Potomac River. By mid-December, an estimated 37 heavy guns commanded the river with numerous field guns in support. Any ship running the blockade would have to pass six miles of guns along the shoreline, which meant that even the fastest ship would be under fire for at least an hour. In addition, the narrow creeks along the Potomac harbored the Confederate steamer, City of Richmond (former George Page), which threatened unescorted ships on the river.

Despite the danger, the bravest civilian captains continued to take their ships past the batteries. The favorite method was to sail at night under cover of darkness. The Northern ships also had an unknown advantage: the poor shooting of Confederate gunners. The South had a severe shortage of trained artificers when the war began, and many of the gunners along the Potomac were infantrymen who had received orders to man the guns, with little or no training. Even practice did not make perfect. General Hooker wrote on November 1, 1861, “The random shooting of the enemy renders it an adventure of comparative safety. My observation is that they [Union ships] are as likely to be struck by lightning as by the rebel shot.” Elaborating further on November 11th, “They do fire wretchedly. Whether it is owing to the projectiles or to the guns I am not informed. Several of the pieces are rifled, but they seem to throw more wildly, if possible, than the smoothbores. From what was witnessed to-day and on previous occasions, I am forced to the conclusion that the rebel batteries in this vicinity should not be a terror to any one.”

Across the river, Hooker’s Union forces actively sought to harass the Confederate batteries. A two-gun battery was built to fire on Evansport. In November 1861, the Union artificers opened a bombardment, making the open areas around the Confederate guns almost impossible to be in during the day. Although numerous shells were fired, only a few men on either side were wounded. The unexploded shells became camp curiosities for the soldiers.
The town of Occoquan occupied a strategic point at the fall line of the Occoquan River. Earthwork fortifications were erected above the town by Confederate forces over the winter of 1861-1862 to guard against any Union advance from the opposite side of the river. The shallow draft side wheel steamer U.S.S. Stepping Stones of the U.S. Navy’s Potomac Flotilla, patrolled up the river and drew Confederate fire on two occasions during this period. Colonel Wade Hampton made his headquarters at the Hammill Hotel (above at the corner of Union and Commerce Streets) over the winter while Hampton’s Legion went into winter quarters nearby at Camp Wigfall. By late 1862, the town was well behind Union lines but not entirely safe from raids by Confederate cavalry. Hampton returned with his cavalry battalion December 18-19, 1862 causing a skirmish in the town. J.E.B. Stuart also passed through Occoquan on December 28, 1862 during his "Christmas" raid behind Union lines.

Attempting to foil the Confederate guns, the Union Navy towed slower ships past the batteries with tug boats. The schooner Fairfax was being towed by several tugs when the ropes broke opposite Shipping Point, stranding the Fairfax. The Confederates captured her with her load of hay and cement. Another schooner was halted by a lack of wind on November 14th across from Cockpit Point. The ship was hit three times by southern shells, causing the crew to abandon ship and swim to the Maryland shore. A party of Confederates boarded the vessel and set her afire. As they returned to shore, a small boat with several Massachusetts soldiers boarded the ship, doused the fire, and towed the ship to a safe harbor on the Maryland side of the Potomac. In January 1862, the captain of the steamer Mystic stopped his ship across from the Shipping Point battery inviting the guns to fire on his vessel. Eighty-seven shells were fired without a single one striking the Mystic. The warship Pensacola ran past the Confederate batteries in January with the aid of pre-dawn darkness and a confusing series of lanterns used to fool the Confederate gunners. Only 20 shots were fired at the ship and most of those were fired in desperation after she had passed the guns.

The Cockpit Point Battery was also tested in January 1862 by the Anacostia and the Yankee. The two navy ships, anchored in what was believed to be a blind spot for the battery guns, stood off to the north of the battery and lobbed shells into the gun emplacements. The ships had some success, but two of the battery guns were able to return fire and hit the ships. There was little loss on either side. Still, the potential threat of the batteries was enough to discourage most commercial shipping.

All through the winter, the Northern politicians in Washington were becoming more and more anxious for movement from McClellan’s army. The Union general resisted all efforts from the administration, feeling that a major engagement on the upper Potomac would yield little in the way of strategic results. He believed that the Potomac blockade should be ignored since Washington could be supplied by way of Baltimore. President Lincoln continued the pressure to open the river, and McClellan ordered Joseph Hooker to begin planning, with the Navy, for a joint assault on the batteries. Aided by balloon reconnaissance, Hooker was convinced that the guns could
be taken but McClellan continued to delay any real action on the Potomac. On March 8, 1862, a frustrated President Lincoln issued a direct order to the Union general that contained provisions for "an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay." McClellan, however, never got the opportunity to carry out this order.

Unbeknownst to the Unions, General Johnston had already decided to abandon Northern Virginia and the river batteries. Anticipating McClellan to move his army by water past the Confederate positions and cut them off from Richmond, Johnston was compelled to withdraw and consolidate his thin lines below the Rappahannock to better protect the Confederate capital.

On March 7, 1862, Confederate units along the river received orders to withdraw the next morning. They were to carry away as much equipment as they could and destroy what was left behind. The wooden carriages of the heavy guns were set on fire. Additionally, the gun tubes were loaded and packed with sand and mud so that they would explode when the heat from the fire reached the powder charge. Because the guns were packed too loosely, only a few were actually destroyed.

Confederate Artillery Major Stephen D. Lee reported the evacuation of Bacon Race Church as follows: “At Bacon Race Church, at the time I took charge, several days before the movement, I found about 400 stands of arms, a quantity of ammunition, medical and quartermaster’s stores; also about fifteen old wagons and harness (unserviceable). I succeeded in sending to Manassas... all the arms, ammunition, and stores of value. All that was destroyed were the old wagons and harness (which were unserviceable), a quantity of loose cartridges, amounting to several boxes, and a quantity of private baggage. I should also state that a small amount of commissary stores were issued to the poor people in the vicinity by my order, there being no transportation for them.”

BACON RACE CHURCH SITE

Bacon Race Church (c. 1836) was first appropriated for military use when Hampton's Legion camped in its vicinity in mid-August 1861. The church initially served as a field hospital for "Camp Griffin" named in honor of the Legion’s new Lieutenant Colonel. Ordered to support the Confederate batteries being built along the Potomac River, Hampton's troops broke camp on September 20 and moved to Freestone Point but the Legion's sick were left behind to convalesce at the church. The Legion returned to Bacon Race on October 19, establishing a new camp named for Major M.C. Butler, and remained there until going into winter quarters near Occoquan in early December.

Over the winter of 1861-1862, the church served as a store house for Hampton's entire brigade composed of Hampton's Legion, the 14th Georgia, 19th Georgia, 16th North Carolina, and Bachman’s German Battery. The brigade was assigned to picket the lower Occoquan River, a line that extended 12 miles. The 16th North Carolina and 14th Georgia remained camped in the vicinity of Bacon Race in support of the batteries guarding the crossing points at Wolf Run Shoals and Sally-Davis Ford.
On March 9, 1862, Union pickets on the Maryland shore noticed none of the usual activity in the batteries across the river. The positions were shelled with no response. Landing parties soon established that the positions had been abandoned. They found the camps littered with personal items, with some of the huts still containing tables set for uneaten meals. On March 10, Hooker had 1,000 soldiers at work destroying the batteries. The captured cannons were salvaged by the Navy and taken to the Washington Navy Yard. Many of the rifle pits were torn down, and over 800 shells and dozens of pieces of camp equipment were carried back across the river.

After the Confederate withdrawal from Northern Virginia, the war in Virginia shifted to the vicinity of Richmond. General McClellan began his Peninsular Campaign to capture Richmond in April 1862. In June, after General Joseph E. Johnston was seriously wounded in the Battle of Fair Oaks, General Robert E. Lee was appointed to command what would become the Army of Northern Virginia. In a series of battles known as the Seven Days, Lee pushed McClellan’s army away from Richmond. By early July, McClellan had taken refuge at Harrison’s Landing on the lower James River.

As the war near Richmond progressed, however, Prince William County became vitally important to the Union. Any Union army fighting to the south had to be supplied by either the Potomac River, which forms the eastern border of the county; the Telegraph Road, which is just inland from the Potomac; or the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which is in the central and western portion of the county. These supply lines were vulnerable to attack, and even the threat of disruption caused major concern at the highest levels of the Union command.

The county was too large for the Union army to garrison every road or town. One solution was to establish a permanent line of cavalry pickets. This line began near the outer limits of Fairfax County, and, roughly following the Telegraph Road, extended through Prince William County into Stafford County to the south. The picket line actually consisted of small squads of cavalry guarding the major roads, intersections and fords while larger cavalry units were based in camps located within supporting range of the picket posts. The area of Prince William County beyond the purview of the picket line was controlled by patrolling cavalry units. They moved through the
countryside periodically in order to gather intelligence on enemy movements and maintain a Union presence.

The first months of Union occupation were quiet ones for the Union troops. The roving patrols were mainly used to chasing stray Confederates who had deserted or were home on leave. There was little organized resistance to the Union cavalry.
Stone House

Built in 1848 by Thomas Ottway Clark, the Stone House served as a tavern for turnpike travelers. By the time of the Civil War, it was the home of Henry and Jane Matthews. During both battles it served as one of the many temporary field hospitals sheltering Northern wounded. For lack of ambulances many of the wounded were left behind to face an uncertain future as the Union army retreated. They and the medical officers who remained were all subject to capture by Company A of the 28th Virginia Infantry. The surgeons did what they could to save lives under very adverse conditions but many died. After the first battle, a southern newspaper correspondent writing about "a stone house along the roadside" noted that the filth was so disgusting his tarry was very brief. After Second Manassas the Confederates used the house as a parole station for wounded Union prisoners. Although damaged, the Stone House survived the war and remained a private home until 1949. It is one of only two original structures remaining on the battlefield.

Battle of Second Manassas

On June 26, 1862, the Union “Army of Virginia” was created, with Major General John Pope as its commander. Pope's responsibility was to protect Washington, D.C. and control the region north and west of Richmond to the Shenandoah Valley. His first task was to cooperate with McClellan and divert Confederate forces from the ongoing battles around Richmond. After concentrating his army near Warrenton, on July 12 Pope mobilized his troops to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad, a vital Confederate supply line to the Shenandoah Valley. General Robert E. Lee learned of this move and reacted immediately. Major General Stonewall Jackson and 18,000 men were sent by rail to block Pope's advance. On July 19 they arrived at Gordonsville. Pope lost his opportunity to cut the Virginia Central Railroad.

The two forces warily eyed one another but avoided a general engagement. By early August 1862, Lee determined that McClellan’s army at Harrison’s Landing on the James River posed little threat to Richmond and decided that the time was ripe to strike Pope before he could fully concentrate his army. On August 7 Jackson, with an additional division sent by Lee, advanced on Pope near Culpeper Court House. Pope hurriedly tried to mass his forces to meet the Confederate advance and on August 9 fought Jackson at Cedar Mountain. The battle was a standoff but the timely arrival of Union reinforcements compelled Jackson to fall back to Orange Court House south of the Rapidan River.

At Richmond, Lee received intelligence that McClellan’s army was withdrawing from the Peninsula, thus freeing the rest of his army under Longstreet to join Jackson. By August 15 most of Lee's army was moving against Pope. The odds now favored Lee. Pope's army numbered about 45,000; Lee's about 55,000. If Pope could hold his forward position until reinforcements from McClellan could arrive, he would still be in a position to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad. However, Pope’s main line of supply, the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, was long, tenuous and could be cut at any number of places. Learning of Lee’s concentration, Pope withdrew his army behind the upper Rappahannock River on August 19. In spite of considerable skirmishing, Pope’s defensive line held...
against Lee’s probing for five days. Within a week, Pope could expect McClellan’s reinforcements to bring his strength to over 100,000 men, enough to soundly defeat Lee.

On the rainy night of August 22, Brigadier General J.E.B. Stuart raided the vulnerable Union supply line at Catlett's Station. Although unable to burn the wet railroad bridge and cut off Pope’s supplies, Stuart took pleasure in discovering Pope’s headquarters baggage. A captured dispatch book revealed that Union reinforcements were expected to join Pope shortly. This information was quickly reported to Lee. Lee realized that if he was to defeat Pope and prevent the concentration of a massive Union army, he had to act immediately.

On August 25, in a move that defied conventional military wisdom, Lee boldly divided his army, sending 25,000 men under Jackson's command on a flanking march around Pope's army. Jackson was to gain Pope's rear and cut his supply line on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The remainder of Lee’s army, Longstreet’s Right Wing, would remain along the Rappahannock in Pope's front in order to keep him from learning of Jackson's maneuver. Marching 51 miles in two days, Jackson's “foot cavalry” severed Pope's line of supply and communications at Bristoe Station on the evening of August 26. Jackson’s forces then advanced along the railroad to Manassas Junction where they met little resistance and captured a huge Union supply depot full of much needed food and equipment.

Pope was now forced to re-access the situation. With his supply line cut he had little choice but to abandon his strong positions along the upper Rappahannock. There was, however, a silver lining to this cloud. Jackson was isolated behind Union lines and Pope felt confident that with his entire army he could cut off Jackson’s escape, crush him with superior numbers and then turn on and defeat the rest of Lee’s now diminished army. Pope ordered his forces to converge on Manassas Junction, leaving the Rappahannock and Longstreet’s wing of Lee’s army behind them. This is essentially what Lee calculated Pope would do. The balance of Lee’s army then proceeded to follow the same circuitous route that Jackson had taken two days earlier with the objective of reuniting with Jackson against Pope on more favorable ground.
One Union column led by Joseph Hooker’s division advanced from Catlett Station along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and attacked Jackson’s rear guard under General Richard Ewell in the vicinity of Bristoe Station on the afternoon of August 27 in what became known as the Battle of Kettle Run. After offering stubborn resistance, Ewell’s troops withdrew in textbook fashion to rejoin Jackson at Manassas Junction, leaving 35 Confederate dead behind on the field. Union casualties numbered around 300 killed and wounded.

Another Union force, the 1st New Jersey Brigade under General George Taylor, was sent out from Alexandria on August 27 to investigate the reports of enemy activity at Manassas Junction. Upon reaching the eastern outskirts of Manassas Junction, Taylor’s troops were surprised to find the Confederates in such heavy force. Falling back to the railroad bridge at Union Mills, the New Jersey regiments were hard pressed by Jackson’s infantry and artillery. Union forces sustained heavy losses to include General Taylor who was mortally wounded while trying to rally his troops near the bridge.

That night Jackson torched the remaining Union supplies that could not be carried off and made his escape. The next day Jackson’s three divisions rested in the woods on Stony Ridge north of an unfinished railroad grade between Sudley Church and Groveton. Pope spent the day looking for Jackson but to no avail.

Meanwhile, Lee’s other wing under Major General James Longstreet arrived at Thoroughfare Gap on the afternoon of August 28, 1862, less than a day’s march from Jackson. Longstreet found the eastern side of the gap blocked by a Union division under General James B. Ricketts which had also just arrived with orders to detain Longstreet while Pope supposedly subdued Jackson at Manassas Junction. D.R. Jones’s division, leading Longstreet's column, battled the Union troops in the vicinity of Chapman's Mill which changed hands three times. The most intense.

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**BLOOM’S (CONNER) HOUSE**

General Joseph E. Johnston may have used the house as his headquarters after First Manassas and before moving to Fairfax Station on September 13, 1861. Over the following winter the house was likely used as a hospital for Confederate troops suffering the effects of disease. The house served in that capacity during the Union occupation of Manassas in 1862. At that time it was generally referred to as the “Yellow Hospital.” Evidence of yellow ochre paint has been found on its exterior walls. It is not known how many soldiers died at this hospital but burials in the vicinity of the house and nearby Camp Walker have been reported.

On August 27, 1862, General George Taylor’s 1st New Jersey Brigade gallantly advanced past this house from the direction of Union Mills but were soon compelled to retreat upon being confronted by A.P. Hill’s division of Jackson’s command.

The house takes its name from its last occupants in the mid-20th century, the Conner family. It is now preserved by the City of Manassas Park. (8220 Conner Drive)
fighting took place between 1st Georgia Regulars and the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment along a narrow quarry trench on the hillside behind the mill.

Meanwhile Colonel Evander Law's Confederate brigade scaled Mother Leathercoat Mountain on the north side of the gap. By dusk, the southerners had gained both flanks of Ricketts' position and forced his withdrawal giving Lee a clear path to reunite with Jackson.

Jackson knew that once the Confederate army was united, Pope would probably withdraw again, this time to Centreville, and await the rest of McClellan's reinforcements, which would make the Union army practically unassailable. Jackson realized that Pope needed to be drawn into battle while the odds were somewhat more even. On the evening of the 28th, Jackson attacked a passing Union column on the Warrenton Turnpike near Groveton which resulted in a bloody but indecisive engagement. Jackson sustained heavy losses

This narrow passage through the Bull Run Mountains witnessed a number of significant events during the Civil War. In July 1861, General J.E. Johnston's "Army of the Shenandoah" rode through the gap on the Manassas Gap Railroad on their way to reinforce General P.G.T. Beauregard's "Army of the Potomac" at Manassas. It was the first strategic use of a railroad in this country for the transport of troops to battle and it greatly contributed to the Confederate victory at First Manassas. Over the winter of 1861 and 1862, Chapman's mill complex became a meat processing and storage facility for the Confederate army encamped around Manassas and Centreville. The mill and hundreds of pounds of meat had to be abandoned and went up in smoke when the Confederate army evacuated the area in March 1862.

On August 26, nearly 25,000 men led by "Stonewall" Jackson passed unopposed through the gap and gained the rear of Union General John Pope's Army of Virginia. Two days later, on August 28, General Lee, with the other half of his army under James Longstreet, arrived at the gap and found it blocked by Ricketts’ Union division. The small but intense battle here enabled Lee to unite the two wings of his army in a timely manner against General Pope's army. It proved decisive to the Confederate victory at Second Manassas.

Known since the war as Beverley's Mill for its postwar owner, the mill remained in operation until 1950. An arson fire gutted the mill on October 22, 1998 but the ruins have now been stabilized to preserve this important landmark.
including two seriously wounded division commanders, William B. Taliaferro and Richard S. Ewell, but revealing his position had the desired effect. Pope deployed his army to strike Jackson the next day.

Pope was confident of an easy victory, not knowing of Longstreet's approach. He assaulted Jackson's line along the unfinished railroad at dawn on August 29 and continued the attacks all day with elements of three separate corps. The fighting along the railroad grade was intended to hold Jackson in place until the newly arrived Union Fifth Corps from McClellan's army under Major General Fitz John Porter could deliver a decisive blow to what was thought to be Jackson's right flank at Groveton.

The Union attacks along the unfinished railroad were not well coordinated but came close to breaking Jackson's line at different points. By nightfall, Jackson's Confederates still held their strong position in the woods along the unfinished railroad. Porter's 10,000 troops found themselves blocked by Longstreet's 30,000 men that had arrived on the field that morning, forming on Jackson's right and extending the Confederate line well to the south of the turnpike at Groveton. Facing overwhelming numbers of the enemy and being widely separated from other supporting troops, Porter elected not to carry out Pope's discretionary attack orders. This would later make him a convenient scapegoat and lead to his court-martial. However, Porter's presence off Longstreet's right flank inadvertently kept Longstreet from committing his troops to the battle on August 29th.

Still oblivious to Longstreet's arrival on the field, Pope was frustrated that Porter had not joined the battle but regarded the day as a great success for his men. He knew that the enemy had been badly battered and he felt Jackson now had no option but to retreat. He ordered a pursuit of the Confederates the following day and fully expected to claim victory for the North. The entire Confederate army would be waiting for the attack.
Pope found Jackson still in his front on the morning of August 30, 1862 and made plans for a crushing final assault. Fitz John Porter’s command was ordered to report directly to Pope’s headquarters that morning and these fresh troops were assigned to make the attack. That afternoon Porter advanced with five brigades and almost broke through Jackson's right center. With their ammunition depleted, Jackson’s infantry along the unfinished railroad began hurling rocks in desperation as Union troops closed in. However, a large concentration of Confederate artillery posted on a ridge to the west tore the Union lines to shreds and effectively broke up the attack.

Lee, waiting for the perfect moment to reveal his presence, ordered Longstreet to counterattack at 4 P.M. Despite repeated warnings, Pope had deployed relatively few troops south of the turnpike to protect his left flank. This is where Longstreet struck. The Confederate counterattack rolled over the Union defenders like a tidal wave. A makeshift Union line held onto Chinn Ridge long enough for Pope to build a stronger defensive line along the Sudley Road and Henry Hill, which held until nightfall. Recognizing the futility of continuing, Pope then withdrew the Union army from the battlefield under the cover of darkness.

Pope's army retreated to Centreville in better order than that of McDowell's the previous year. This time, Lee followed up his victory by sending Jackson’s exhausted troops on another flank march around Pope’s position at Centreville in an attempt to cut off his retreat. Union cavalry detected the Confederate movement and alerted Pope to the danger. Late in the afternoon of September 1, 1861, elements of Pope’s army intercepted Jackson’s column at Ox Hill, near Chantilly. The resulting battle, fought in a torrential thunderstorm, ended inconclusively but bought time for Pope’s battered army to escape to the safety of the Washington, D.C. defenses.
The opening shots of the First Battle of Manassas were fired by a Union 30-pounder Parrott rifle in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge at dawn on July 21, 1861. This was part of a demonstration to divert Confederate attention away from the main Union column crossing Bull Run upstream at Sudley Ford. The bridge, originally built in 1825 to carry the Warrenton Turnpike over Bull Run, came through First Manassas unscathed but on March 9, 1862, it was blown up by the departing Confederate army. Only the abutments on either side of the stream remained. Union engineers subsequently erected a wooden bridge at the site. After the last of General Pope's army retreated across this bridge on the night of August 30, 1862, it was destroyed by the Union rear guard. The Stone Bridge was completely rebuilt in the 1880s and it continued in use until the mid-1920s.

For the North, the Battle of Second Manassas was another terrible disappointment and embarrassment abroad. Pope’s 14,462 casualties were a terrible price to pay for a defeat. The resolve of the Union leaders for victory, however, was only strengthened. Lee’s victory at Second Manassas cost the South over 9,000 men of an army of only 55,000. Lee now saw an opportunity to remain on the offensive and carry the war for the first time into northern territory. Within the week his army was splashing across the Potomac and advancing into western Maryland.

Lee's movement into Maryland signaled a major shift in Confederate war policy. Confederate leaders had come to realize that the war would be long and arduous and that recognition and assistance from European powers would not come from simply holding their own territory. They had to go on the offensive.

Lee's apparent objective in the North was the rail center of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania but this could not be gained. His invasion of the North ended prematurely after the Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg) on September 17, 1862. Although Lee’s army held its ground in the battle, serious losses compelled its return to Virginia.

With the defeat of Pope's army at the Battle of Second Manassas, Prince William County was only briefly behind Confederate lines. A Union cavalry expedition through Bristoe Station on September 25, 1862, met with no opposition. For the remainder of 1862 Prince William County was again under the watchful eye of Union troops. A minor skirmish was reported at Bristoe Station on October 24. On the night of November 4, 1862, German troops of the Union Eleventh Corps sacked and burned the town of Haymarket in retaliation for Union pickets that had been shot by “bushwhackers.” A number of homes on the Manassas battlefield were also torched about this same time.
Portici, the home of Frank Lewis and his family, served as General Joseph E. Johnston’s headquarters during the First Battle of Manassas. Immediately afterward it became a Confederate field hospital where a number of Union wounded, to include Colonel Orlando B. Willcox and artillery Captain James B. Ricketts, were brought. This is how the house appeared in March of 1862. A sharp cavalry engagement took place on the grounds near the house late on August 30, 1862. It was the largest encounter of opposing cavalry until the Battle of Brandy Station on June 9, 1863. Portici survived the Second Battle of Manassas but Union troops torched this house and two others on the Manassas battlefield, Pittsylvania and Rosefield, in November of 1862.
ST. PAUL'S CHURCH, HAYMARKET

Built in 1801, this structure was a district courthouse until 1812, then became a school and public meeting hall until deeded to the Episcopal Church in 1833. The Prince William Rifles, a militia company formed in November 1859 following John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry, drilled in the church yard. On July 21, 1861, the church served as a field hospital for Confederate casualties from the First Battle of Manassas. About 80 soldiers died of their wounds here and were buried in a trench on the south side of the church. St. Paul's Church is one of the few structures in the town of Haymarket to escape the conflagration in November 1862. However, the church suffered the indignity of being used as a stable by a Union cavalry regiment occupying the town in 1863 and it burned shortly thereafter.

Union and Confederate forces frequently passed through Haymarket and occasionally there were confrontations. Cavalry skirmishes were fought on the outskirts of the town on August 28, 1862 during the Second Manassas campaign, on October 16, 1862, as Union forces reasserted control in the area, on June 21 and 25, 1863 as the opposing armies moved north to Gettysburg, and one last time on October 19, 1863 in action associated with the "Buckland Races." The June 25, 1863 engagement diverted J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry around the Union army and the resulting loss of contact between Lee and his cavalry ultimately had a critical impact at Gettysburg.

Cavalry Operations and Mosby's Confederacy

In November 1862, President Lincoln put General Ambrose Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac, replacing General George B. McClellan. In December, as the opposing armies confronted each other along the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg, the Union supply line along the Telegraph Road in Prince William County appeared a very inviting target for Confederate cavalry. Major General J.E.B. Stuart decided to probe the Union defenses in northern Virginia and ordered Brigadier General Wade Hampton to organize a raid on the Union supply line in Prince William County. The purpose of the raid was to distract the enemy during the anticipated battle at Fredericksburg and to gather information on the strength of the Union forces protecting the supply line.

Hampton had been stationed in Prince William County during the previous winter and knew the road network well. On December 10, 1862, Hampton led a force of 250 men into Prince William County. On the morning of December 12, Hampton’s cavalry charged into the town of Dumfries, taking the garrison by surprise. Over 50 Union cavalrymen and 24 wagons were captured. On December 17 Hampton again crossed the Rappahannock River and rode into the county, this time with almost 500 men, camping that night at Cole's Store (near present-day Independent Hill). The following morning Hampton struck the Union pickets on Neabsco Creek, capturing the entire post and eight supply wagons.

Having pierced the Union line undetected, Hampton moved against the town of Occoquan. He divided his command into three columns. They hit the town at the same time, capturing a supply train of loaded wagons that were preparing to cross the Occoquan River. In addition, the column that had taken the Telegraph Road
captured every picket post along the road. Alerted to the Confederate raid on Occoquan, the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry with 100 men of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry crossed Selecman’s Ford above the town on December 19 but not before Hampton had retired with his spoils of war. The Union cavalry drove in Hampton’s pickets and, after making a cautious scout, returned across the ford after dark. Hampton’s cavalry camped that night at Cole's Store and returned to the main army the following morning with 150 prisoners and 20 wagons as evidence of the success of his raid.

Having learned of the ease of penetrating the Union supply line, General Stuart was determined to duplicate the feat. On the afternoon of December 26, 1862, he personally led 1,800 cavalrymen with four cannon into Prince William County. The following morning, he struck the Union supply line in three places. A detachment under Hampton's command was sent towards Occoquan, while two other detachments cut the Telegraph Road above and below Dumfries.

The attack caught the Union troops by surprise, and again many of the Union cavalry pickets were captured. The victorious Confederates swept into the town of Dumfries, where they unexpectedly encountered strong resistance. The Union commanders had learned from Hampton's raids a few days before and had stationed a brigade of infantry in Dumfries to support the picket line. Stuart's first reaction was to attack and capture the town. Upon determining the strength of the Union defenses, however, he decided to bypass the Union infantry. He occupied the Union troops with skirmishes and artillery exchanges until nightfall and then withdrew. Hampton in the meantime had captured the Union pickets that had been placed at Cole's Store and had charged back into the town of Occoquan, scattering the Union defenders back across the Occoquan River into Fairfax County. That night Stuart had his entire command at Cole's Store. The prisoners and captured wagons were sent back towards the main army, and Stuart planned for the next day. Union forces now had warning and ample time to prepare a response to the raid.

SELECMAN’S / SNYDER’S FORD
Selecman’s (a.k.a. Snyder’s) Ford was a narrow, rocky crossing point on the Occoquan River approximately 1-1/2 miles above the town of Occoquan. While considered impractical for vehicles, the ford was frequently used by cavalry. The ford saw action on December 19 and on December 28, 1862, during General J.E.B. Stuart’s famous “Christmas Raid.” Another “affair” occurred here on the morning of March 22, 1863, when about 70 men from the 4th Virginia Cavalry and local guerilla units made a pre-dawn attack on the reserve picket camp of the 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry. The attackers wounded 3, captured 19, as many horses, before retreating in the direction of Selecman’s Ford with their prisoners. A sharp skirmish erupted at the ford as the men assigned to the picket post disputed the passage of the Confederates but the vastly outnumbered pickets were soon forced to retire and the Confederates made good their escape.

The site of Selecman’s Ford is now under 60 feet of water but the historic road trace to the ford can still be found on the Fairfax side of the Occoquan in Sandy Run Regional Park. The Prince William County Historical Commission has placed an historical marker at the site.
On the morning of December 28, 1862, Stuart moved his cavalry toward Bacon Race Church. A detachment of the 2nd South Carolina Cavalry was sent ahead to disperse the Union cavalry pickets stationed there before the main cavalry force arrived. The South Carolinians soon encountered the Union pickets and found a large force of Union cavalry supported by two artillery pieces holding the church. The South Carolinians engaged the Union cavalry, expecting their own reinforcements to arrive at any moment. The reinforcements never came and the Confederates had to withdraw to avoid capture.

After dispatching the 2nd South Carolina Cavalry to capture Bacon Race Church, Stuart moved north past Greenwood Church where he unexpectedly encountered a force of about 250 men of the 2nd and 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry drawn up in line of battle across his path. Making a reconnaissance, the Union cavalry had tracked Hampton from Occoquan and had expected to find only a small raiding party, not over 1,000 Confederate cavalrmen. Stuart quickly ordered the 1st Virginia Cavalry to charge the Union horsemen, who broke and rode for safety after a brief struggle. The chase went on for over two miles. The Union troopers then made a brief stand at Selecman's Ford. Dismounted Confederates lined the river bank and poured a shower of carbine bullets across the river while Colonel Thomas Rosser’s 5th Virginia Cavalry led a gallant charge across the narrow, rocky ford by file and dispersed the enemy without losing a man. Major John Pelham’s horse artillery joined this movement despite the treacherous nature of the ford. After dispersing or capturing the dismounted Unions that had contested the crossing, the Confederate cavalry pressed two miles into Fairfax County where they sacked and burned a Union camp. The outnumbered Union force lost 2 officers killed, 10 enlisted wounded, and 100 men captured.

Stuart ordered his entire force across the river and sent two scouting parties to Occoquan and Wolf Run Shoals before continuing north. By nightfall the Confederates occupied Burke's Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Stuart continued his Christmas raid through Fairfax County and on December 29, recrossed the Rappahannock River having lost scarcely a man. Once again, the Union high command was reminded of the vulnerability of their supply line.
Stuart did not intend to leave the Union lines in Northern Virginia alone. He returned to the main Confederate army at Fredericksburg but left behind a trusted captain named John Singleton Mosby. Mosby and his nine men were instructed to continue disrupting the Union supply lines. Mosby had continuously asked Stuart for permission to operate behind enemy lines and it was finally granted. Partisan bands had operated in all theaters of the war with varied success. Although Stuart did not initially expect much from this small detachment, he created the nucleus of what was to become the most effective partisan force of the Civil War.

The partisan groups generally had a strong romantic appeal among the general population of the South. Many military leaders, however, felt that such bands only distracted men and resources from the main war effort. Nevertheless, a Partisan Ranger bill had been passed by the Confederate government legitimizing this form of warfare. Proponents of the bill argued that small bands of mobile, mounted men could tie down large numbers of a numerically superior enemy. Mosby began to put this idea into practice in Northern Virginia in January 1863.

He led his nine men on small raids on isolated picket posts in Fairfax County, choosing only those that were most exposed and where there was little risk to his men. The isolated posts were virtually indefensible to Confederate attack, but had to be maintained to complete the Union cavalry screen. Stories of Mosby's success spread, bringing new recruits. They were supplied with captured Union arms, equipment, and horses. In early 1863 Mosby's command was loosely organized and composed mostly of soldiers on leave, local men who had a high sense of adventure, and men home on convalescent leave. He had few men who were regular members of the command. Mosby, nevertheless, refused to enlist deserters or men who belonged to other military branches. In doing so, Mosby eliminated any question about the legitimacy of his unit and the form of warfare he practiced.

Mosby's early operations took place in Fairfax County from bases in Fauquier and Loudoun counties. One of his most infamous raids occurred on the night of March 9, 1863, resulting in the capture of Union General Edwin Stoughton at Fairfax Court House. Mosby escaped with his prisoner.

Built in 1827, Evergreen was the home of Edmund Berkeley (1824-1915) during the Civil War. The plantation, now a country club in northwestern Prince William County, provided shelter to a number of families who lost their homes when Union troops burned Haymarket in November 1862. When the war broke out in 1861, Edmund Berkeley raised a local company known as the Evergreen Guards. It was mustered into the 8th Virginia Infantry as Company C with Berkeley as its captain. Berkeley later rose to become the Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment while his brother, Norborne Berkeley, served as Colonel. The 8th Virginia fought in every major battle with the Army of Northern Virginia and, after sustaining heavy losses at Gettysburg, became known as “The Bloody Eighth.” Edmund was wounded twice, at South Mountain and at Gettysburg.

Berkeley was very active in veteran’s affairs after the war and helped organize the 1911 Jubilee of Peace in Manassas.
through Prince William County, crossing Bull Run at Sudley Ford and following the Warrenton Turnpike from Groveton through Buckland and beyond.

In April 1863 the situation changed as General Joseph Hooker, now in command of the Army of the Potomac, sent a force of cavalry to occupy Warrenton in Fauquier County. Once Warrenton was safely in Union hands, Hooker began to use the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to supply his army. Stuart ordered Mosby to interrupt the Union supply line on April 26, just as Hooker was preparing for the Battle of Chancellorsville.

The Union troops guarding the railroad knew that Confederate partisans would try to disrupt the supply line. In anticipation, they stationed strong parties of infantry, cavalry, and artillery at all the most crucial points along the tracks. The most vulnerable points were the railroad bridges, so the strongest defenses and garrisons were placed at Union Mills where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crossed Bull Run. Other smaller bridges were also guarded. General Julius Stahel commanded the rail guards, which were composed of more than two brigades of Union cavalry with supporting artillery.

The garrisons were too strong for Mosby and his men to capture by force. Instead, he tore up the unguarded sections of the track between Catlett's Station and Bristoe Station. He tried to burn the railroad bridge over Kettle Run just to the west of Bristoe Station, but a large Union infantry guard aboard a train saved the bridge. The following week, Mosby and 25 of his men moved to harass the Telegraph Road supply line. They were intercepted by a Union cavalry patrol one mile from Dumfries, which they routed in a short, bloody engagement. Having been detected, Mosby abandoned his plan and returned to Fauquier County.

About 9 a.m. on May 30, 1863, Major Mosby with 48 of his rangers ambushed a Union supply train on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad near Catlett's Station, firing on it with a newly acquired 12-pounder mountain howitzer.
Attacking the railroad was especially dangerous as Union cavalry camps had been established about every two miles in the area due to previous raids. The 1st Vermont, 5th New York and 7th Michigan Cavalry, assigned to guard the railroad at Bristoe Station, quickly responded and cut short the pillaging of the supply train.

Mosby's men took flight along the Burwell Road and passed through Greenwich with the Union cavalry in hot pursuit. Mosby’s escape through Greenwich was slowed by the cannon and he was ultimately forced to make a stand at the head of a short, narrow lane near the Fitzhugh farm, "Grapewood," two miles outside Greenwich.

Lieutenant Sam Chapman of Mosby's command placed the small howitzer in the road and fired canister as the Union cavalry charged up the fenced lane in column formation, four abreast. The blast shattered the column and Mosby then led a dashing countercharge resulting in desperate hand-to-hand fighting. The Union cavalry regrouped but were driven back two more times by the fire from the howitzer. In the end Mosby's men scattered after their artillery ammunition was exhausted. Of the 170 Union cavalry present that day, 4 were killed and 15 wounded. Mosby had to abandon the howitzer along with 5 dead and 20 wounded who were taken prisoner. During the struggle Mosby lost one of his bravest men, Bradford Smith Hoskins, a former Captain in the British Army, who willingly served as an enlisted man in Mosby’s command.

Charles Green, an Englishman residing in nearby Greenwich, took a wagon loaded with ice and brandy to the battle area (just west of the county line) and assisted the wounded of both sides. He took the mortally wounded Hoskins to his home, “The Lawn,” along with another Confederate officer. Hoskins was buried at Greenwich Presbyterian Church. Mr. Green placed a monument over the grave at the request of Captain Hoskins's father, an English churchman.

For much of the summer of 1863, Mosby's men were occupied by the passing of the armies of both sides to Gettysburg and then back again. Although they were forced to remain in hiding much of the time, they still

EWELL'S CHAPEL

(On private property off Loudoun Drive near its intersection with Route 15.)

The home of Dr. Jesse Ewell, "Dunblane," was situated about one half mile to the west of the small chapel he built along the Carolina Road. Confederate General Richard S. Ewell, a cousin, was brought to the home for a brief period in September 1862 to convalesce after suffering the amputation of his leg as a result of a knee wound in the Battle of Groveton, August 28, 1862. As Lee's army retreated south after the Maryland Campaign, General Ewell was evacuated along the Mountain Road and through Hopewell Gap.

A Civil War Trails sign marks the site of the no longer standing chapel. Local residents buried the only Union casualty of the ambush on June 22, 1863. The unmarked grave of Sgt. Martin Aumiller remains in the vicinity.

A Civil War Trails sign marks the site of the no longer standing chapel. Local residents buried the only Union casualty of the ambush on June 22, 1863. The unmarked grave of Sgt. Martin Aumiller remains in the vicinity.
managed to provide General Lee with information on Union army movements and capture Union stragglers.

On June 22, 1863, General George Meade set a trap for the elusive “Gray Ghost” at Ewell’s Chapel. Acting on a tip that Mosby and about 25 of his men would be passing through the farm of Dr. Jesse Ewell from the Bull Run Mountains that morning, a detachment of the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry was deployed as bait while a company from the 14th U.S. Infantry hid along the Carolina Road near the chapel. As Mosby approached the chapel he spotted, shot and killed Union Sergeant Martin Aumiller of Company D, 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry who had been posted as a lookout in a tree. The concealed Union infantry rose and fired a volley but Mosby and his followers quickly scattered and managed to escape with only three wounded. General Meade wrote afterward, “Thus the prettiest chance in the world to dispose of Mr. Mosby was lost.”

Three days later, while screening the Army of Northern Virginia as it marched north towards Pennsylvania, J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry approached Haymarket from the west and encountered the entire U.S. Second Corps moving northward on the Carolina Road. Stuart shelled the column with artillery but Union infantry soon forced his retreat toward Buckland. Compelled to alter his plans, Stuart embarked on a wide ride around the Union army, taking the road through Brentsville and crossing the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals. Contact was lost with General Lee who was deprived of Stuart’s eyes and ears on the way to Gettysburg. Stuart’s absence brought harsh criticism afterward.

In August 1863 the Union supply line was again on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Mosby continued his captures of Union pickets and poorly guarded wagon trains. The rail line was too closely guarded in Prince William County for Mosby to attack it directly. He did, however, capture several Union soldiers on the Manassas battlefield on August 21.

The Union railroad guards learned to fortify the vulnerable points along the line and to position their cavalry units effectively so that they could respond at a moment’s notice to a Confederate attack. In addition, an infantry guard was placed on each train. After the May 30 attack, Mosby generally focused on less guarded targets. Mosby also began to send trusted officers out on separate missions, a tactic that spread the guerrilla attacks over the entire northern Virginia region.

CANNON BRANCH FORT

Located off Gateway Blvd. near the Manassas Airport, this site is part of the Manassas Museum System. For more information go to www.manassasmuseum.org

Little is known about the origin of this earthwork fortification along the railroad south of Manassas. It is believed to have been built by Union forces during the later part of the war to protect the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, an important supply artery for the Union army, from guerilla raids. At the time of the war the walls of the fort would have been higher, affording the troops within better protection. The area surrounding this fortification would also have been generally devoid of trees, providing a clear view and field of fire covering the railroad bridge over Cannon Branch.
Skirmishes were reported near Bristoe Station and between Centreville and Warrenton on September 12. On September 24, another raid was made against Bristoe Station, but the Confederates were unsuccessful at breaking the supply line because of General Meade’s well placed detachments of infantry along the tracks.

There were skirmishes at Brentsville Courthouse on November 26 and 29, 1863, but with negligible results. In 1864, cavalry skirmishing continued on February 1, and again on March 16 when Confederate partisans under the overall command of Colonel John S. Mosby attempted to interrupt the Union supply line at Bristoe Station. A military action at Bristoe Station also occurred on April 15, 1864, when three members of Mosby's command ambushed the Union pickets of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry above the station on Broad Run, killing one Union and capturing four horses. These raids, however, had little effect on the Union's flow of supplies to the south.

In the summer and fall of 1864, the emphasis of the war shifted to the Shenandoah Valley and most of the Mosby's operations moved to the west as well. The main Union army was now around Petersburg and Richmond. Supplies to that army were being brought in by water and were safe from capture. Although skirmishes still occurred between roving Union cavalry patrols and Confederate partisans, the war in Prince William County was winding down. On November 11, 1864, there was a cavalry engagement at Manassas Junction which resulted in only minor casualties.

Because of the scarcity of food and fodder, many of Mosby's rangers were forced to leave Northern Virginia during the winter months of 1864-1865. General Sheridan, in an attempt to rid Mosby from his “Confederacy,” ordered his forces to "consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills, and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region.” Only homes were to be left intact.

The contribution of Mosby's command, which eventually grew to eight companies, cannot be measured by the numbers of Union casualties or the supplies captured from 1863 through 1865 in Northern Virginia, although they were substantial. The real importance of the Partisan
Rangers was that, because of their effectiveness, many Union soldiers were required to remain in Northern Virginia to hold open the Northern supply lines. These were soldiers who could have been fighting for the North on the front lines around Richmond and Petersburg. The use of guerrilla warfare against a numerically superior enemy was one of the contributions of the Civil War to modern warfare, and no one practiced this art of warfare with greater skill than John S. Mosby.

The Union soldiers who occupied Prince William County could take satisfaction from the fact that although they were fighting against the best Confederate partisan commander, they fulfilled their mission by keeping the supply lines open. In doing so, they often paid the price in blood.

General Samuel Crawford’s headquarters at Bristoe Station, February 6, 1864
Battle of Bristoe Station

In early 1863 the main armies were positioned to the southeast around Fredericksburg, and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad was no longer the major supply route for either army. Union patrols occasionally passed through Bristoe, but no major actions occurred in the area until the summer.

The main armies, on their way to Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863), moved through Northern Virginia. After the Confederate army's dramatic defeat, the armies again moved south. Lee's army based itself around the town of Culpeper and in Madison County to the west. The Union Army of the Potomac, now commanded by General George G. Meade, followed Lee's army southward and positioned itself on the north side of the Rappahannock River near Warrenton. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad again became a primary supply route. Both armies rested during the remainder of the summer.

In September the Confederate high command detached General James Longstreet's corps from the Army of Northern Virginia and deployed its troops by rail to the western theater near where the states of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama meet. Longstreet left on September 9, reducing Lee's army by over one third and leaving Lee to face a far more numerically superior enemy. Lee's mission until Longstreet returned was to keep the Union army occupied so that they could not reinforce the western armies. At the same time, he was not to lose any ground in Virginia.

The two armies skirmished for the rest of September 1863. Meade then learned of the transfer of Longstreet. In response, he detached two Union corps from the Army of the Potomac on September 25 and sent them west. The Union army still outnumbered the Confederate army 75,000 to 45,000, but Lee took the offensive and launched a campaign with his remaining forces to prevent additional Union troops from moving west. On October 10, 1863, the Confederate army began maneuvering around the Union right flank near Culpeper. This was the beginning of the Bristoe Campaign. In order to avoid what had happened to Pope the previous year, Meade began withdrawing his army eastward towards Centreville.

October 11-13, 1863 were days of maneuvering for both armies. Taking circuitous routes across country to conceal their movements from Union signal stations, the two Confederate corps marched to Culpeper and then to Warrenton. The Union army had the advantage of interior lines and withdrew directly eastward along the railroad to avoid being cut off from their supply line to Washington. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry screened the Confederate advance and at the same time harassed the retreating Union troops.
The October 14, 1863 Battle of Bristoe Station effectively ended Robert E. Lee’s last major offensive campaign of the war. General A.P. Hill’s 3rd Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia led the pursuit of Gen. George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac as it retreated towards Centreville. At Bristoe they encountered Meade’s rear guard, the 2nd Corps under Gen. G.K. Warren, strongly entrenched behind the railroad embankment. Pressing the attack, Hill suffered nearly 140 killed, 800 wounded and another 445 men unaccounted for. Lee could not tolerate such heavy losses. As they rode over the battlefield the following morning, Lee reportedly reprimanded Hill saying, “Well, General, bury these poor men and let us say no more about it.” The Army of Northern Virginia subsequently tore up the railroad and retreated south never to return to Prince William County.

(For more information on the 133-acre Bristoe Station Battlefield Heritage Park off Rt. 619, visit www.pwecgov.org/historicsites)

At 10 A.M. on October 14, General A. P. Hill's Third Corps reached Greenwich en route to Bristoe Station. There they found evidence of the Union line of march. Upon reaching Greenwich that morning, a North Carolina soldier noted, "We found Federal campfires still burning and evident signs of departure in haste.....it was almost like boys chasing a hare.” Hill ordered his men to pursue the Union column. As the Confederates continued their march to Bristoe Station they noted abandoned blankets, knapsacks, and other equipment littering the road, indicating that the Union soldiers were not far away.

As the Confederate column neared Bristoe Station, General Hill rode ahead to locate the Union infantry. He halted on the high ground a mile north of the station and observed the entire Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac resting across Broad Run at Milford Mill just to the east of Bristoe Station. Hill ordered his lead division, commanded by General Henry Heth, to quicken its march. The division was only one and one-half miles from the station. Nearing the high ground overlooking Bristoe Station, Heth deployed his first three brigades in line of battle and waited for the other three brigades of the division to form a reserve. Hill, afraid the Union troops would detect his advance and escape, ordered Heth to advance his three brigades on the field and attack the enemy at once.

As Heth's three brigades neared the open ground overlooking Broad Run, Hill deployed William Poague's battalion of artillery to fire on the unsuspecting enemy troops. The artillery pieces wheeled into action; their first shots signaled the opening of the Battle of Bristoe Station. The Fifth Corps infantry on the plain across Broad Run had watched the artillery going into position but believed the guns were Union. The sound of shells passing overhead convinced them otherwise. As one of their own batteries returned the fire, the Fifth Corps infantry withdrew towards Manassas Junction and safety.

General A.P. Hill observed the retreat and ordered Heth's men to advance and strike the enemy while they were disorganized. The three leading Confederate brigades broke into the open fields and moved toward Broad Run. The Southerners expected an easy battle and cheerfully
advanced. Laughter changed to cries as they were struck by volleys of rifle-musket fire from the vicinity of the railroad tracks.

Unbeknownst to General Hill, the entire Union Second Corps under the command of Major General Governeur K. Warren was marching along the far side of the railroad to join the Fifth Corps, which had been waiting on the other side of Broad Run. Some of Warren's leading units had started to cross the run when the Confederate artillery opened up on the Fifth Corps. Warren realized the advantage of his position and directed his men to form a line of battle behind the railroad tracks, which formed a natural fortification and shielded his troops.

Heth reported to Hill that a strong enemy force was now on his right flank, but Hill was caught up in the pursuit of the retreating Fifth Corps and believed other units of his corps now approaching the battlefield would protect the Confederate flank. He ordered the advance to continue. The Confederates in the lead recognized the disastrous consequences of a further advance but pushed forward anyway.

The two Confederate brigades in front, composed of about 4,000 North Carolinians under Brigadier Generals John R. Cooke and W.W. Kirkland, shifted their line of advance and attacked toward the railroad. Three brigades of Warren's Second Corps (about 3,000 men) awaited them, backed by three artillery batteries. The North Carolinians were unaware of the strength of the Union line of infantry hidden behind the railroad embankment, but saw the batteries on the hills beyond and ran quickly forward to engage the guns before they could cause too much damage to themselves. The Union infantry calmly waited behind the railroad until the North Carolinians were at point blank range and then rose up and at a range of only thirty to forty yards poured a devastating volley into the Confederate battle line. Both Confederate brigade commanders were wounded almost immediately, as were many of the field officers.

Colonel E.D. Hall of the 46th North Carolina took command of Cooke's brigade knowing that his men must either move forward or retreat, for as every second passed, more fell. The regiment led the brigade forward, but as the
regimental historian later wrote, "The point from which we started was distinctly marked; at least four, and in some cases ten men from each company were lying dead or wounded in that line." The regiment got within twenty steps of the railroad but was ordered back because the rest of the regiments of the brigade had not followed.

Kirkland's brigade was not as exposed as Cooke's and actually managed to capture part of the embankment near the railroad bridge. The 11th and part of the 47th North Carolina regiments captured several prisoners and drove the Union right flank back from the railroad. Finding themselves alone and under a severe flanking fire from Captain Brown's Battery B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery on the other side of Broad Run, they withdrew back across the deadly field. Other individual Confederates mounted the embankment and engaged in hand-to-hand combat with Union soldiers. They were soon overcome. A sergeant of the 19th Maine Infantry shot one of these Confederates at only musket length away, and then bayoneted another as he tried to mount the embankment. One North Carolinian was able to get over the embankment and bayonet a member of the 1st Minnesota before becoming a casualty himself.

Both Kirkland's and Cooke's brigades began to retreat up the open hill they had just so boldly come down. The 44th North Carolina Regiment of Kirkland's brigade had to be ordered three times to withdraw before giving up the field. Other Confederates hugged the ground until a lull in the firing. They then threw down their weapons and ran as future prisoners to safety behind the railroad. In only 15 to 20 minutes, the first Confederate attack had been bloodily repulsed. Over 1,300 men in gray had fallen in the assault, compared to about 600 Union troops.

As the two brigades withdrew, the reinforcements that Hill had promised to protect the right flank arrived and attacked to the right of the North Carolinians. Two brigades of Major General Richard H. Anderson's division actually broke the Union line on the railroad in a wooded area but were driven out by rapidly arriving Union reinforcements. Both commanders then began to consolidate their positions as more men arrived on both sides. As evening fell, Warren had his entire corps in position around Bristoe Station, using the railroad line as his main defensive position. Hill drew his corps up opposite Warren. Major General Richard S. Ewell's corps arrived at Bristoe Station in the evening to complete the concentration of Lee's army. No offensive action was taken, however, and Warren's Second Corps was allowed to withdraw during the night to Centreville and join the main body of the Union army.

Recognizing the strength of the Union position, Lee declined pursuit. He made his headquarters at Bristoe until October 17. The men killed at Bristoe Station were buried on the ground where they fell. The North Carolinians were buried in individual graves on the hillside where they had fought; but identifying those who had fallen was a difficult task. One Confederate later wrote, "a few we could only find some pieces of the body such as a hand or three fingers. Sometimes a foot or part of a foot, sometimes a whole arm, or half the head, and bodies mangled in every conceivable condition."

A newspaper correspondent wrote of finding "a large number of broken muskets, knapsacks, etc., strewn over the ground. One patch on the side of the hill is red with..."
graves. They are chiefly North Carolinians; so say the slabs at the head of the graves."
All of the bodies that could be identified were later removed to North Carolina, but
many are believed to still remain on the field today in unmarked graves.

Lee withdrew his army to the Rappahannock River on October 18, 1863 after destroying
the railroad from Bristoe to the river to delay Meade's return to the region. The Army
of Northern Virginia would never again see the familiar fields of Prince William
County.

Ruins of the Confederate military railroad bridge over Bull Run above Mitchell’s Ford,
March 1862
The historic village of Buckland Mills, situated along the Warrenton Turnpike in the valley of Broad Run, largely survived the passing of Civil War armies and time.

The most notable action here was a sequel to the Bristoe campaign on October 19, 1863. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, assigned to cover the retreat of Lee's army, offered resistance to the advance of Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's Union cavalry division at Buckland bridge. Stuart retreated toward Warrenton after Gen. George Custer's Union brigade turned his flanks. Henry Davies' Union brigade then gave chase. Custer's troops, remaining at Buckland to regroup, were then attacked and forced to withdraw by Fitzhugh Lee's division advancing from the direction of Greenwich. Upon hearing the battle in his rear, Davies broke off his pursuit of Stuart near Warrenton. Stuart quickly counter-attacked. The resulting "Buckland Races" gave the Confederate horsemen a morale boosting victory.

The village of Buckland Mills, situated along the Warrenton Turnpike in the valley of Broad Run, saw many passing armies during the course of the war and many of its structures from that period have survived. A skirmish took place here on August 27, 1862 (Second Manassas campaign) as three companies of the 1st (West) Virginia Cavalry, in advance of General Robert Milroy's Union brigade marching towards Gainesville, encountered a detachment of the 1st Virginia Cavalry with one piece of artillery on the east bank of Broad Run attempting to burn the turnpike bridge. Two successive charges by the West Virginians caused the Confederates to withdraw and the bridge was saved.

On the morning of October 19, 1863, with Lee's army withdrawing south after the ill-fated battle of Bristoe Station, Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick's Union cavalry division was sent on a reconnaissance along the Warrenton Turnpike toward Warrenton. At Buckland they met resistance from Major General J.E.B. Stuart's dismounted cavalry and horse artillery in strong positions on the west bank of rain swollen Broad Run. Union Brigadier General George A. Custer's brigade made repeated but unsuccessful dismounted frontal attacks at the turnpike bridge. By noon Custer was able to get across Broad Run above and below the Confederate position. Stuart withdrew toward Warrenton along the turnpike with Brigadier General Henry Davies' fresh Union cavalry brigade in hot pursuit.

Custer's troops remained in the vicinity of Buckland until mid-afternoon and had just started to follow Davies when Major General Fitzhugh Lee's Confederate cavalry division appeared south of the turnpike, advancing from the direction of Greenwich. Custer formed a defensive line on the south side of the village but his outnumbered troopers were eventually compelled to retreat. Fitz Lee's Confederates captured the bridge and pursued Custer's troops as far as Gainesville.

The sound of gunfire at Buckland alerted General Kilpatrick, with Davies' brigade, of trouble in his rear. He immediately broke off the pursuit of Stuart as they reached Chestnut Hill near Warrenton. Stuart just as quickly
counterattacked and began pressing the Union cavalry hard in the opposite direction. At New Baltimore, learning that the enemy now held Buckland, Davies' brigade turned north on a side road leading to Thoroughfare Gap. The 2nd New York Cavalry and 1st West Virginia Cavalry remained behind on the turnpike to hold off Stuart. With the advantage of repeating Spencer carbines these troops fought well but were soon overwhelmed. In their retreat many were overtaken and captured on the turnpike in the direction of Buckland. The "Buckland Races," as it was celebrated in the South, ended an otherwise unsuccessful campaign for the Confederates.

Because of threats from Mosby's Rangers, the railroad in Prince William County remained under close Union guard for the remainder of the war. Little fighting occurred in Prince William County in the last few months of the war. On February 18, 1865, 100 men of the 8th Illinois Cavalry patrolled through the county unopposed, picking up Confederate stragglers. They burned the campsite of a local group of Mosby's men, and returned with 15 prisoners who were captured during the night while sleeping in local homes.

The last shots fired in the county may have occurred on April 10, 1865, the day after the surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox. While on a raid in Fairfax County, one of Mosby's companies was surprised by a detachment of the 8th Illinois Cavalry. The Confederates were chased across Wolf Run Shoals into Prince William County but the Union cavalry broke off their pursuit at the ford. A parting shot fired over the river signaled the end of the war in Northern Virginia. Mosby disbanded his rangers at Salem (Marshall, Va. today) on April 21 and surrendered himself on June 17, 1865, at Lynchburg.

MANASSAS TOWN CEMETERY (Confederate Monument)

The remains of 250 Confederate soldiers were re-interred in a one-acre section of the Manassas Town Cemetery shortly after the war. Nearly all had died from disease while encamped around Manassas over the winter of 1861-1862. The bodies were recovered from original grave sites on surrounding farms. The 75-foot red sandstone monument, built by J.R. Tillet, a veteran of Company H, 15th Virginia Cavalry, was dedicated on August 30, 1889. In 1909 the monument was capped by a bronze statue of a Confederate soldier "At Rest." A complete list of the known Confederate dead in this cemetery is maintained at the Bull Run Regional Library and the Manassas Museum.
APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

April 17, 1861   Virginia State Convention votes for secession (Approved by citizens May 23)

May 8, 1861   Gen. Philip St.George Cocke orders the Powhatan Troop of cavalry and a section of the Alexandria Light Artillery to Manassas Junction following the evacuation of Alexandria

May 11, 1861   Gen. Cocke at Manassas Junction directs deployment of troops to hold Dumfries and Occoquan

May 21, 1861   Gen. M.L. Bonham assigned command at Manassas (S.O. 95) and subsequently directed to begin constructing entrenchments to fortify the junction

June 1, 1861   Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard arrives to take command of Confederate forces concentrated at Manassas (S.O. 149)

July 18, 1861   Fight at Blackburn's Ford

July 21, 1861   First Battle of Manassas (Bull Run)

Sept. 25, 1861   Confederate battery at Freestone Point opens fire on U.S. Navy ships

Oct. 15, 1861   Confederate batteries at Evansport engaged for first time

March 9, 1862   Confederate evacuation of Manassas and river batteries

March 11, 1862   Union reconnaissance to Manassas Junction

March 21-22, 1862   Union reconnaissance to Dumfries

June 19, 1862   President Lincoln visits Gen. McDowell at Liberia

Aug. 26, 1862   Stonewall Jackson passes through Thoroughfare Gap and cuts General Pope's supply line at Bristoe Station

Aug. 27, 1862   Jackson captures Manassas Junction, repulses a New Jersey brigade advancing from Union Mills while Ewell battles Hooker in a rear guard action at Kettle Run.

Aug. 28, 1862   Battle of Thoroughfare Gap; Battle of Brawner Farm at Groveton

Aug. 29-30, 1862   Second Battle of Manassas (Groveton)

Sept. 25-29, 1862   Union expeditions to Bristoe Station and Buckland Mills
Oct. 16, 1862  2nd North Carolina Cavalry attack at Haymarket

Oct. 24, 1862  Skirmishes at Manassas Junction, Bristoe Station

Nov. 4, 1862  Haymarket sacked and burned by Union troops

Dec. 2, 1862  Capture of 1st New Jersey Cavalry pickets at Dumfries

Dec. 12, 1862  Wade Hampton's cavalry raid Dumfries

Dec. 18-19, 1862  Hampton's cavalry strikes a picket post at Kanky's Store (Neabsco Mills); Skirmishing at Occoquan and Selecman’s Ford

Dec. 21-23, 1862  Union cavalry scouts to Brentsville

Dec. 27-29, 1862  J.E.B. Stuart's "Christmas" raid on Dumfries, Fairfax and associated action at Selecman’s Ford

Jan. 9, 1863  Cavalry skirmish at Brentsville

March 10, 1863  Mosby escapes through Prince William after successful raid on Fairfax Court House and the capture of Union General Edwin Stoughton

March 15, 1863  Affair at Dumfries

March 22, 1863  Affair near Occoquan (Selecman’s Ford); Mosby raids Bristoe Station

March 29, May 17, 1863  Skirmishes at Dumfries

May 30, 1863  Mosby pursued through Greenwich by Union cavalry following a raid on the railroad near Catlett Station

June 21, 1863  Cavalry skirmish at Haymarket

June 22, 1863  Mosby escapes Union ambush at Ewell's Chapel

June 25, 1863  J.E.B. Stuart attacks Union column at Haymarket

June 27, 1863  J.E.B. Stuart passes through Brentsville and crosses Occoquan River at Wolf Run Shoals in ride around Union army

Aug. 14, 1863  Union cavalry scout to the Bull Run Mountains

Oct. 14, 1863  Battle of Bristoe Station

Oct. 19, 1863  "Buckland Races"; Skirmish at Haymarket
Nov. 26, 29, 1863  Cavalry skirmishes at Brentsville

Feb. 1, 1864  Skirmish at Bristoe Station

Feb. 14, 1864  Affair at Brentsville

March 8, 1864  Union cavalry scouts to Brentsville

March 16, April 15, 1864  Skirmishes at Bristoe Station

Nov. 11, 1864  Skirmish at Manassas Junction

Feb. 6-7, 1865  Union cavalry scouts to Brentsville

April 9, 1865  Lee surrenders the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, Va.

The Orange & Alexandria Railroad Bridge at Union Mills was the scene of heavy fighting on August 27, 1862. General George Taylor, in command of a New Jersey brigade, was mortally wounded here while trying to rally his troops against Stonewall Jackson’s forces. The bridge was destroyed and rebuilt multiple times during the war. (National Archives photo)
APPENDIX B:
MAP OF CIVIL WAR SITES IN PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

Prince William County
Civil War Sites
Map Key to Prince William County Civil War Sites

1. Ewell’s Chapel
2. Evergreen (Edmund Berkeley House)
3. Antioch Church – Hopewell Gap
4. Chapman’s (Beverley) Mill – Thoroughfare Gap
5. St. Paul’s Church, Haymarket
6. Buckland
7. Greenwich
8. Kettle Run/Bristoe Station Battlefield
9. Cannon Branch Fort
10. Manassas Town Cemetery
11. Brentsville
12. William’s Ordinary (Love’s Tavern), Dumfries
13. Freestone Point (Leesylvania State Park)
14. Cockpit Point (Possum Nose)
15. Evansport – Shipping Point Batteries (Quantico)
16. Hammill Hotel, Occoquan
17. Selecman’s/Snyder’s Ford
18. Sally-Davis Ford
19. Bacon Race Church
20. Wolf Run Shoals
21. Mayfield Fort
22. Signal Hill
23. Union Mills (O & A Railroad Bridge)
24. Bloom’s (Conner) House
25. Manassas Junction
26. Yorkshire (Wilmer McLean House)
27. Liberia (William Weir House)
28. Blackburn’s Ford
29. Mitchell’s Ford
30. Ben Lomond Manor House (Pringle House)
31. Henry Hill (Manassas NBP)
32. Stone Bridge (Manassas NBP)
33. Stone House (Manassas NBP)
34. Groveton Confederate Cemetery (Manassas NBP)
35. Sudley Springs Ford (Manassas NBP)
36. Sudley Methodist Church
37. Lucinda Dogan House (Manassas NBP)
38. Unfinished Railroad “Deep Cut” (Manassas NBP)
39. Brawner Farm (Manassas NBP)